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SEXISM IN THE STATUTES: IDENTIFYING AND SOLVING THE
PROBLEM OF AMBIGUOUS GENDER BIAS IN LEGAL WRITING
INTRODUCTION
Following the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Reed v. Reed,1 courts and legislatures have devoted substantial at-
tention to evaluating, and in many cases eradicating, sex-based dis-
tinctions in federal and state laws. The courts have generally fo-
cused on establishing and applying the appropriate standard for
reviewing sex-based classifications.2 At the same time, Congress
and state legislatures have been concerned with the processes of
ratifying the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)3 and its
state counterparts, 4 and also with the modification of sex-based
provisions in the laws under their respective jurisdictions.' The
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a provision of the Idaho probate code
that preferred males over females as administrators).
2. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), the Court held that the statute did not even
meet the relatively minimal requirement that it bear a "fair and substantial relation" to a
state objective. The Court used a higher standard of review in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), where the Court voided a statute that required female officers in the armed
services to prove they had dependents while presuming that male officers had families to
support. The holding that sex was a suspect classification, thereby requiring a compelling
state interest to be valid, was unprecedented; however, because Justice Brennan only wrote
for a plurality of the Court, it was also non-precedential. Three years later, in Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the Court adopted an intermediate standard of review for sex-
based classifications: statutes must serve "important governmental objectives" if they treat
members of both sexes differently.
3. Congress submitted the federal ERA to the state legislatures for ratification on
March 23, 1972. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REc. 9809, 9907 (1972). It
extended the ratification deadline in October of 1978, when the amendment still needed
approval by at least three more states. H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.
34, 314-15 (1978). The ratification process ended on July 1, 1982, when the 1979 extension
expired. See 128 CONG. Ruc. S7771-74 (daily ed. July 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
4. Seventeen states (Alaska, Colo., Conn., Hawaii, Ill., Md., Mass., Mont., N.H., N.J.,
N.M., Pa., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., & Wyo.) have passed state ERAs of differing forms. C.
THOMAS, SEx DISCRIMINATION 380 (1982). Voters in New York State defeated a proposed
state ERA in 1975.
5. Some legislative changes are in direct response to court actions which construed the
statutes in issue. For example, after a New York court held in Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19,
103 N.Y.S. 2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951), that "adultery" did not include homosexual relation-
ships, the state legislature specifically included such conduct in the definition of adultery in
its divorce statute. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977).
On the other hand, court action is not always essential to prompt a legislature to change
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legislative and judicial branches have not always coordinated their
efforts in dealing with sex-based distinctions.' Nevertheless, their
combined efforts in the decade since Reed have produced impor-
tant progress toward the goal of sexual equality.7
Commentators have devoted considerable attention to these
legislative and judicial actions, to the relationship between them,
and to the effect that passage or failure of the federal ERA will
have on that relationship." For the most part, however, these com-
mentators have only dealt with two of the three ways in which sex
bias has entered the law. First, many of them have analyzed cases
that involved unambiguously sex-biased classifications. A law
might say, for instance, that "all men, but no women, are eligible
for benefit X"; the bias against women in such a law is clear."
There has also been ample analysis of cases involving classifica-
tions that are, literally, gender-neutral. This type of law, on its
face, applies the same standard to members of both sexes; an ex-
ample would be "all armed service veterans are eligible for benefit
Y." The law is literally gender-neutral, but may still be subject to
a biased statute. A good example is New York's Equitable Distribution Law, N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1982), which the legislature passed without being challenged as
to the constitutionality of the earlier property distribution law.
6. Some commentators have decried the failure of a majority of the Court to declare
that sex is a suspect classification. See, e.g., Dubnoff, Sex Discrimination in the Burger
Court - A Retreat in Progress?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 369 (1981) (advocating application of
equal protection clause to women); Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal - The Supreme Court
and Gender Classification - 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. REv. 87, 95 (1981) (Court "returned
women to the pedestal, stripped of much of their personhood"); Lombard, Sex: A Classiflca-
tion in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1355 (1975) (author finds "immense
significance" in difference between the burden of proof required by the challenging party
under the "strict scrutiny" test applied to "suspect" classfications, and the lesser burden
applied to "ordinary" classifications through the "rational relationship" test).
7. Some have argued, however, that not enough progress has been made. See, e.g., Gins-
burg, From No Rights, to Half Rights, to Confusing Rights, 7 Hum. RTS. 12 (1978);
Knowles, The Legal Status of Women in Alabama: A Crazy Quilt, 29 ALA. L. REv. 427
(1978) (some statutes already corrected, but other modifications are still necessary); Conlin,
Equal Protection versus Equal Rights Amendment - Where Are We Now?, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 259, 329 (1975) ("any vestigal faith in the ultimate recognition by the courts of the
principle of equality has vanished").
8. When this Comment was drafted, articles discussing this relationship from the post-
ERA-defeat perspective had yet to appear. See supra notes 6-7 for a collection of some of
the pre-defeat views on the subject. For treatment of some of the broader implications of
passage of the federal ERA, see Strong, Contributions of ERA to Constitutional Exegesis,
14 GA. L. REv. 389 (1980).
9. The statutes in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), were biased in this way.
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constitutional challenge. 10 The third source of sex bias in law lies
between the extremes of literally biased law and literally bias-free
law; consider, for instance, the statute that says "a person is eligi-
ble for benefit Z if he is married and over the age of 18." Women
may, or may not, be eligible for this benefit. This Comment will
focus on these "ambiguously sex-biased classifications," which use
gender-specific words (such as "he" and "man") that always refer
to men but only sometimes refer to women.
The problem of ambiguously sex-biased classifications in legal
writing is a manifestation of a more general problem in the English
language, i.e., that many gender-biased words have no grammati-
cally acceptable gender-neutral alternative. Most legal writers
probably believe this problem is one that linguists, not lawyers,
should be solving.1 Nevertheless, legal writers should be aware of
the problem of bias in the language, as it affects their own legal
writing.12 To a limited extent, this Comment addresses this general
problem.'" The main focus, however, is on the legal problem of am-
biguously sex-biased classifications, which results from the gender
bias in the English language. Judges must be aware of the legal
aspects of these classifications if they are to decide cases arising
pursuant to them, and legislators must understand ambiguously
sex-biased classifications if they are to prevent similar statutory
difficulties from arising in the future.
Ambiguous sex-biased classifications have been the subject of
10. The plaintiff in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) argued that she was
unconstitutionally denied benefit Y (in her case, state employment) because the literally
gender-neutral classification excluded most women but only a few men. (The Court held
that she would have to prove the intentional character of the discriminating legislation in
order to prevail). See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (gender-neutral disability
statute did not work invidious discrimination violative of the Constitution on ground that it
excluded normal pregnancies from coverage).
11. Even some linguists approach the problem with some hesitation: one admits to
"suspect[ing] that most women in the English-speaking world are not even aware of the
problem." M. ADLER, SEx DIFnERENCES IN HUMAN SPEECH 22 (1978). Despite the lack of
popular awareness, linguists have been able to conduct substantial research and analysis of
the general problem. A general discussion of the problem is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, however. For other works providing linguistic background to the legal issues, see gen-
erally: J. AIKEN, ENGLISH PRESENT AND PAST (1930); Bodine, Androcentrism in prescriptive
grammar: singular 'they', sex-indefinite 'he', and 'he or she', 4 LANG. IN SOC'Y 129 (1975);
M. KEY, MALE/FEMALE LANGUAGE (1975); R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975).
12. See Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 752-54 (1978) (not-
ing sexism in legal writing); Biskind, Write It Right, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1972, at 4, col. 4.
13. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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at least some legal analysis. In 1977, the United States Commission
on Civil Rights announced:
Equalization of the treatment of men and women under Federal law is an
overdue task which should command priority attention of the President and
Congress .... [A] myriad of unwarranted differentials clutter the U.S. Code.
While many are obsolete or of minor importance when viewed in isolation,
the cumulative effect is reflective of a society that assigns to women, solely on
the basis of their sex, a subordinate or dependent role.
14
The Commission's report to the President and Congress15 was
based on the findings of a comprehensive study of the U.S. Code,
which identified more than 800 Code provisions that contained va-
rious types of literally biased references.1 6 The Commission did not
recommend changes in provisions that were clearly unbiased or
harmlessly biased,17 and many of its recommended changes con-
cerned Code sections that were literally biased in favor of members
of one sex.18 However, the Commission also directed many of its
recommendations to the ambiguously sex-biased portions of the
Code." It recommended removing the sex-specific terms because
such references "reflect the fact that the use of masculine pro-
nouns and other referents in the Code reinforces the traditional
view of women as members of the 'other' sex."2 0 Most of those rec-
14. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvn RIGHTS, SEx BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE 204 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as SEx BIAS IN THE CODE].
15. The Commission issued its report pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L.
No. 85-315, § 104(b), 71 Stat. 634, 635, as amended. Heading the research team was Colum-
bia University law professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now a D.C. Circuit Judge.
16. SEx BIAS IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 13. The study found the 800 sections by
using a computer program that searched for 59 "key" biased words. Id. at 11-12. Therefore,
the study could not identify all of the literally gender-neutral provisions in the Code to
which women or men might object.
17. Two types of retrieved provisions are not relevant here. "[S]ections which specifi-
cally prohibit sex discrimination rather than differentiate between females and males" were
not discussed in the study. Id. at 13. In addition, the Commission made only passing refer-
ence to such biased references as those in proper names; e.g., it "left undisturbed" refer-
ences to "Twin Sisters Mountain," 16 U.S.C. § 192 (1982), and "Minute Man National
Park," id. § 410s. SEX BIAs IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 89.
18. E.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 1064-1082 (repealed 1980), which provided annuities to widows
regardless of their dependency status but only to widowers if they were dependent on their
late spouses. See SEx BIAS IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 111-13.
19. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715m (1982), which provides a housing certificate to a "service-
man" or his "widow." There is no counterpart for servicewomen or their widowers, so this
classification must therefore be termed ambiguously biased. See SEx BIAS IN THE CODE,
supra note 14, at 81-82.
20. SEx BIAS IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 14.
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ommendations called for the eradication of particular ambiguously
sex-biased references. The Commission reasoned:
While the United States Supreme Court, the ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution, might have determined that "man" also means "woman" in terms
of rights, duties, privileges, and obligations under the Constitution, the Court
instead has chosen on numerous occasions to deny to women certain rights
and privileges not denied to men.
2 1
The Commission enunciated these views more than six years ago.
Its assertions indicate that the general problem of gender bias
should be given at least some attention by members of the legal
community.
Thus far, Congress and the President have not given "priority
attention" 22 to the problem of ambiguously sex-biased classifica-
tions. Recently, more than a quarter of the United States Senators
in the 98th Congress co-sponsored a bill "to amend the laws of the
United States to eliminate gender-based discrimination. '23 How-
ever, even if these amendments pass, it is not certain that they will
change all the existing ambiguously sex-biased classifications in the
U.S. Code. In any case, the amendments will not have any direct
effect on gender-biased provisions in state laws.24 Accordingly,
there is still a need for evaluating whether the courts of the 1980s
will continue to exclude "woman" from the meaning of "man" (or
vice versa), so as to deny to members of one sex rights and privi-
leges never denied to the other.
Part I of this Comment will first deal briefly with some of the
causes of gender bias in legal writing. It will then attempt a more
thorough analysis of the legal effects of that bias. Five distinct
types of ambiguously sex-biased language in statutes and legal doc-
uments will be presented, and the similarities and differences
among them then discussed. The remainder of Part I is devoted to
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 204.
23. S. 501, 98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983).
24. The problem is by no means solely a federal one. In 1981, a New York State Sena-
tor remarked:
The use of "man,.. "men," "mankind," etc. is prevalent in spite of the meaning
of the law to refer to people, person or persons, human beings, etc. The State of
New York has long been committed to equal rights for all of its citizens, men
and women.. . . It is inappropriate, in today's society, for the laws of New York
to contain statutory language that refers to only one gender ... to apply to all
people.
1981 LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 395 (statement of Sen. Winikow).
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a critical evaluation of existing methods to limit the extent of the
biased classifications. Part II will consider alternatives to the now-
prevailing uses of ambiguously sex-biased classifications in statu-
tory and non-statutory provisions. Some of these alternatives will
be tailored to eradicate bias in statutes and legal documents.25
However, the preferred solution applies to all kinds of legal writ-
ing. It proposes to eradicate the problem of ambiguously sex-bi-
ased classifications by literally removing the words that cause the
ambiguities. Indeed, it is a solution that many legal writers have
already chosen.2 6
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: THE ORIGINS AND EFFECTS OF
GENDER-BIASED PROVISIONS AND THE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THOSE
EFFECTS
A. The Political and Seemingly Non-Political Reasons for
Gender Bias in the Law
Since many of today's laws are carryovers from previous de-
cades or even previous centuries, it is not surprising that some
statutes remain in their original gender-biased form. Prior to 1850,
the main reason for writing gender-biased laws was essentially
rooted in the politics of the era: legislators had no need to draft
statutes in gender-neutral terms. According to one commentator:
[I]n the first half of the nineteenth century there were no challenges to classi-
fications based on sex. So deeply engrained were the customs and traditions
of the day that no one thought to question sex discrimination. That women
were denied, among other things, the right to vote, to serve on juries, and to
enter into certain professions was an accepted fact of political life.27
It follows that it would have been equally acceptable, in the early
nineteenth century, to draft statutes that only applied to those cit-
izens (i.e., men) who derived benefits or responsibilities from them.
When women's efforts towards equality intensified in the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century, ruling-class men responded with
a different argument: the supremacy of "nature and the physical
order."28 Interestingly, it appears that legislators of those years
25. See infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
27. Comment, Secularization of the Law and Sex Discrimination, 31 MERCER L. REV.
581, 583 (1980).
28. Id. at 586 (when men could no longer deny women their rights on the basis of the
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carried this ideology into their statute writing; the desire was for
simplicity and order in their written laws. At the federal level,
Congress manifested this desire by passing what became known as
the "Dictionary Act,"29 a forerunner of today's federal general-con-
struction statute.3 0 The Act literally extended masculine-gender
words to apply to females,3 1 but according to its Senate sponsor,
"The only object is to get rid of a great deal of verbosity." 2 The
purpose of the "Dictionary Act" was to put statutes in a natural
and logical form; the same rules of nature and logic, at that time,
precluded their applicability to women.
In retrospect, it is questionable whether this aesthetic motive
was the only reason for not extending statutes directly to women.
For as the nineteenth century continued, some women became, to
an extent, inspired by the relatively improved status of blacks in
America.33 These women sought to be included under provisions of
law which referred to "he" and "man," but which neither included
nor excluded women by their terms. More than one legal writer has
pointed out that courts in the late nineteenth century put an end
to the expectations of these women. 4 Since these later efforts to
limit women's rights were as successful as those in the early nine-
teenth century, it must be questioned if the motives of the later
drafters were any less political than those of the earlier ones.
law of God, they shifted to the law of nature).
29. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431.
30. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as
well").
31. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431. The Act did not, however, extend mascu-
line words to females in all cases; see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 775 (1871) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). The
Supreme Court recently reviewed this language in construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), a civil
rights statute passed a few months after the Dictionary Act. See Monnell v. Department of
Social Serve., 436 U.S. 658, 689 n.53 (1978).
33. Comment, supra note 27, at 582.
34. Id., quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (scope of thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments limited to cases of race discrimination). See
also A. SACHS & J. WrLSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW 69 (1979) (Supreme Court frequently
"evaded" the application of race-discrimination doctrine in women's rights cases, and when
it did mention that doctrine, its decisions "invariably... favored male supremacy").
At about the same time, efforts to solve the general problem of gender bias in English
were met with similar resistance by late nineteenth-century grammarians. See Bodine,
supra note 11, at 130-34 (defeat of proposal to use "they" as a singular, gender-neutral




B. The Effects of Gender Bias in Law: Five Characters in Search
of an Ambiguous Sex-Biased Classification
Today's courts must deal with a significant number of cases
involving ambiguously sex-biased classifications. They pose a prob-
lem for the judiciary because courts have had to dispose of most of
them on an individual basis.35 Moreover, a disproportionate num-
ber of the cases appear to come from criminal defendants charged
with sex offenses,38 and the public policy issues raised in their
cases may blur the problem of ambiguous gender-bias when it
arises in other statutory contexts.37
The courts have faced two fundamentally different types of ar-
guments in cases involving ambiguously sex-biased classifications.
In one type, the litigant making the argument, typically a defen-
dant, seeks to escape a penal or pecuniary burden; in the other, the
party, typically a plaintiff, seeks a pecuniary or property benefit.
These cases further break down into three subtypes of "burden"
cases, and two subtypes of "benefit" cases. To illustrate the issues
raised in each of these situations, the cases of five hypothetical
characters, A, B, C, D, and E, will be presented; some of the simi-
larities in their cases will then be discussed.
1. Burden Case No. 1: Classification Does Not Apply
A, a female, is on trial for carrying a concealed weapon. The
applicable statute says that "a person commits [the offense]
when he intends to conceal, and does in fact conceal, a weapon
as defined [elsewhere in the Penal Code]." A claims that the
statute does not apply to a female defendant and that she
should therefore be released.
In this case the claimant argues that since burden-imposing stat-
35. Many courts have no clear alternative to the case-by-case approach. See infra notes
79-82 and accompanying text.
36. A plurality, if not a majority, of the cases cited in this Comment are sex-offense
cases; clearly, such cases do not ordinarily crowd any court's calendar.
37. In Acosta v. Delaware, 417 A.2d 373 (Del. 1980), the court considered this aspect of
the defendant's argument about the ambiguous bias in the state's sex-offense statutes:
[W]e think common sense has to be applied.... We do not think evolving con-
cepts of sexual equality should impact constitutionally in such an abrupt and
callous manner that the only remedy in the legalistic mind is to deny protection
from sexual abuse to small children. We do not think that justice is that blind.
Id. at 376.
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utes should be strictly construed,38 the sex-specific language should
not be extended to members of the other sex. The claimant must,
of course, ignore or distinguish any provisions that permit ex-
tending the sex-specific term to members of both sexes.
Prior to 1971, several claimants prevailed in cases similar to
A's. In 1951, a New York court decided Cohen v. Cohen,3 9 in which
plaintiff sought a divorce from her husband on the ground of adul-
tery. The defendant responded that his wrongdoing was not adul-
tery, since the law defining adultery was sex-specific; that is, it
contemplated that adulterer and accomplice would be of opposite
sexes. 40 Since Mr. Cohen's accomplice was of the same sex, he es-
caped the "burden" by successfully claiming its inapplicability,
and Mrs. Cohen was denied her divorce.
A few years later, in Adamson v. Hoblitzell,41 Kentucky's
highest court considered a similar argument from a female defen-
dant charged with vagrancy. The statute in question provided four
separate grounds for conviction, one of them sex-specific. Defen-
dant therefore argued that the statute as a whole was inapplicable
to her. The court rejected her argument, but it did so on the
ground that her conviction had been pursuant to one of the three
gender-neutral subsections of the statute.4 2 The court did not,
however, address the argument any further, and therefore left open
the possibility that it might have reversed the female's conviction,
on account of statutory inapplicability, had it been under the sex-
specific provision of the statute.
Two other relatively recent cases illustrate the possible contin-
ued viability of A's literal-inapplicability argument. In the 1970
case of Cincinnati v. Wayne,'43 the burden imposed was the rela-
tively conventional one of criminal conviction. The city of Cincin-
nati charged the defendant with violating an ordinance prohibiting
indecent exposure. The court read a reference in the ordinance to
the display of "his person," and since the defendant was female, it
38. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.021 (West 1976). Many legislatures have repudiated the
common-law strict-construction principle. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1970); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 1975) (statutes construed by "fair import of their terms").
39. 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
40. Id. (citing adultery law then in effect, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100 (McKinney 1909),
repealed by 1965 N.Y. Laws 1037, § 3).
41. 279 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1955) (citing vagrancy statute).
42. Id.
43. 23 Ohio App. 2d 91, 261 N.E.2d 131 (1970).
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refused to extend the classification beyond its literal reading.""
In Atkinson v. Thomas,45 the state "burdened" the claimant
by denying her the right to vote in a primary election. The claim-
ant sought to retain her right to vote, but she was faced with an
attempt to disenfranchise her for faling to meet the county's resi-
dency requirement. The test of residency for a "single man" was
that he spend most of his nights in the county; there was no sepa-
rate test for a "single woman." The court refused to extend the
sex-specific test to the other sex, and it denied the petition before
it to disenfranchise the woman.
Cases such as these have not arisen in recent years, primarily
because many of the statutes have been amended to hold members
of both sexes liable for a violation. On the other hand, many provi-
sions still use sex-specific language to refer to the victim of the
claimant's offense.46 The litigant arguing literal inapplicability
then asserts that the statute does not apply because the victim is
not literally included under it. A good example is found in D.G.D.
v. State,7 where defendant claimed that his victim, a female over
fourteen years of age, was not protected by the applicable statute.
The statute prohibited persons from being lewd to "a female or to
a male under the age of fourteen years," and the defendant argued
unsuccessfully that the "under fourteen" language modified both
"male" and "female." The court's conclusion was that the victim
was within the prohibition of the law.48
2. Burden Case No. 2: Classification Should Not Apply
B, a male, is charged (in a separate case) with the same con-
cealed-weapon offense as was A, and the elements of the of-
fense (including the sex-specific language) are the same. B
claims that, since females do not come within the classification,
his equal protection rights would be violated if it were applied
to him.
This kind of argument is a by-product of women securing their
44. Id. at 93-94, 261 N.E.2d at 133-34.
45. 407 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
46. The most famous statute of this type is the federal White-Slave Trade (Mann) Act,
ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (191 0) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)) (prohib-
iting interstate transportation of young girls for immoral purposes).
47. 142 Ga. App. 266, 235 S.E.2d 673 (1977).
48. Id. at 266, 235 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting GA. CODE § 26-2610).
[Vol. 32
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rights under the equal protection clauses embodied within the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Defendants in several different types
of cases have attempted to make B's argument with respect to am-
biguously sex-biased statutes; the most frequent user of the argu-
ment, however, is almost certainly the male sex offender. Such de-
fendants claim that sex-specific language in rape and prostitution
statutes deny them equal protection because women, arguably, can
commit the same offenses without being prosecuted.
In Commonwealth v. Finnegan,49 the defendant was accused
of promoting prostitution. He argued that male-specific language
in the "patronizing" section of Pennsylvania's statute denied him
equal protection because females could patronize prostitutes with-
out criminal penalty. The court noted the literally gender-neutral
language in the sections of the statute that penalized the prostitute
and the procurer, and it concluded that females could indeed be
prosecuted for patronizing. The defendant's equal protection rights
were therefore not violated, since the statute as a whole focused on
the roles played by prostitute and customer, not on the sexes of
the participants.5 0 However, the Finnegan court's reliance on the
language of the particular statute fails to foreclose the possibility
that the same argument could succeed with respect to other ambig-
uously sex-biased provisions of Pennsylvania law.
The improper-applicability argument has been used by a vari-
ety of claimants, not just sex offenders. In the quasi-criminal area
of enforcing support obligations, defendants have also made the ar-
gument. People v. Gilliam51 is typical: the defendant was convicted
of felony nonsupport, and he argued that the statute applied to
men only and therefore violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The court, however, found "a clear legislative intent
that the Penal Code apply to females as well as males, '5 2 and it
held that this intent applied to the felony nonsupport offense. It
also observed that Michigan's divorce law, which created the obli-
gation that the Penal Code enforced, had been amended to provide
49. 280 Pa. Super. 584, 421 A.2d 673 (1980) (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5902
(Purdon 1973)).
50. 280 Pa. Super. at 591-92, 421 A.2d at 1089-90. See also Ex parte Groves, 571
S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (sex-specific statute didn't violate defendant's equal-
protection rights).
51. 108 Mich. App. 695, 310 N.W.2d 843 (1981) (quoting non-support statute, McH.
Comp. LAWS § 750.165 (1968)).
52. 108 Mich. App. at 700, 310 N.W.2d at 845.
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that either parent could be liable for child support.53 In this way,
the court resolved the ambiguity by finding the statute unambigu-
ously unbiased. 4
In the federal courts, several plaintiffs raised the improper-ap-
plicability argument about a support-related provision in the pre-
1978 Bankruptcy Act.5 In re Wasserman5 involved a bankrupt
male claimant who sought to have his support debts to his ex-wife
discharged; the court held that the use of "wife" in the statute cre-
ated a sex-biased classification that was invalid under the Supreme
Court's "fair and substantial relation" test.57 Two years later, how-
ever, a federal district court considered the same provision and up-
held the validity of excluding support debts from discharge in
bankruptcy. The court rejected the defendant's argument, declin-
ing to follow Wasserman, because it was "without merit ... that a
wife's support and maintenance obligations are dischargable in
bankruptcy.
'58
3. Burden Case No. 3: Prejudicial Use of Classification
C is also a criminal defendant. The statute in this case does not
use ambiguously sex-biased classifications, but the judge, when
instructing about the credibility of the witnesses, said, "If a
witness has not proved himself credible to you, do not take his
testimony into account." C appeals the subsequent conviction
on the ground that the judge prejudiced the jury against the
testimony of a male witness who testified in C's behalf.
These cases involve classifications that affect the claimant indi-
rectly but, nonetheless, prejudicially. The claimants are almost al-
53. Id. (quoting divorce statute, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.17a (West Supp. 1982),
which had been amended by 1970 Mich. Pub. Acts 182, § 1, to substitute the words "either
parent" in lieu of "the husband").
54. Accord, Commonwealth v. Baggs, 258 Pa. Super. 133, 392 A.2d 720 (1980) ("he" in
nonsupport statute did not violate state constitution equal rights amendment) (quoting
1972 Pa. Laws 334, PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 18, § 4323 (a) (repealed 1978)).
55. The Bankruptcy Act provided at that time that debts for alimony or for mainte-
nance or support of "wife or child" were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §
35(a)(7) (1976). The statute, as amended in 1978, now refers to support debts to a "spouse,
[or] former spouse" as non-dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (5) (1982).
56. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 467 (D.R.L July 18, 1977).
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), provides the standard of "important govern-
mental objectives," but the Wasserman court found that the classification did not even
meet the lesser test of "fair and substantial relation" in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
58. Stephens v. Stephens, 465 F. Supp. 52, 53 (W.D. Va. 1979).
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ways criminal defendants, and the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments form the foundations of their claims.
Claims of prejudicial application began arising soon after
women were given the right to vote through ratification of the
nineteenth amendment. Criminal defendants claimed that women
thereby obtained the right to serve on juries as well, and that their
cases were therefore prejudiced by statutes denying women the op-
portunity to hear their cases. In 1921, two state courts considered
this question, and while both rejected the fair-trial claims of the
criminal defendants before them, the cases presented different
analyses of the rights of women jurors. In the first of these cases,
State v. James,59 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to extend
to women the right to sit on juries, despite their newly-franchised
status. The existing state juror-qualification statute was held un-
changed by the federal provision:
While [the New Jersey juror qualification] statute does not provide in [its]
terms that men shall be summoned as jurors, it contains a distinct recogni-
tion of the common-law qualification that men only shall be impaneled, by
the use of the personal pronouns of the masculine gender "he" and "his. ' °
The defendant therefore received as fair a trial as the juror qualifi-
cation statute allowed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached
the opposite result as to juror qualifications two weeks later, but in
doing so it did not conclude that the defendant had been deprived
of his right to a fair trial. "[W]hat was being guaranteed. . . was
. . . the right to a jury trial of certain kinds of cases and the
method of trial, and not a rigid fixing of the mode of selecting ju-
rors or their qualifications. .. ."1
Modern-day juror qualifications do not attempt to exclude
women pursuant to common-law tradition; in fact, the Supreme
Court has recently ruled that a defendant's due process rights may
be violated if women have greater freedom than do men to be ex-
empted from juror service.6 2 Nevertheless, prejudicial-application
arguments continue to be made in cases such as the one in C's
hypothetical. Courts, however, have been reluctant to find that ju-
ries or jurors were prejudiced by unenforced sex-specific provisions
59. 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 A. 553 (1921).
60. Id. at 137, 114 A. at 555.
61. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 389, 114 A. 825, 828-29 (1921).
62. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (fact that 15% of jurors were women, com-
pared to over 50% residing in vicinity, was evidence of a due-process violation).
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in grand jury qualification statutes, 3 by reference to "he" in in-
structing a jury about picking a foreman 6 4 or by the kind of in-
struction on credibility that was given in C's case.6 5
4. Benefit Case No. 1: Classification Literally Applies
D, a male, seeks to collect under a state worker's compensation
statute following the death of his wife. The statute contains
references such as "upon his death" and "wife may apply for
benefits." D argues that the statute should be read to include
his claim.
Originally, this argument was made by women in response to the
overt denial of rights to women.66 Two later cases show that the
argument still has merit, and that men and women may seek bene-
fits by using it.
The claimant in Petrozzino v. Monroe Calculating Machine
Co.67 was in essentially the same situation as D in the above hypo-
thetical. The court was "satisfied that . .. the Legislature took
into account that .... [t]he same considerations apply whether
the parent who died is the mother or the father," and it mandated
that "his" in the worker's compensation statute be read as "his or
her."68 Petrozzino illustrates the relatively recent viability of the
literal-applicability argument, for members of either sex, in the
context of statutory interpretation.
63. See McMath v. State, 544 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) and Honeycutt v.
State, 544 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (reference in grand juror statute requiring
the jury foreman to be a "good and lawful man" not violative of defendants' equal protec-
tion rights in absence of showing that statute was used to exclude women from serving as a
jury forewoman).
64. See State v. Berch, 222 N.W.2d 741 (Iowa 1974). The court found that a reference
to "he" in foreman-election instructions did not cause jury to infer that it had to elect a
male for that position. The court said, "The fact that the words 'he' and 'his' refer to either
gender is a matter of common knowledge." Id. at 747.
65. See State v. Poole, 289 N.C. 47, 220 S.E.2d 320 (1975) (judge's use of "his" in credi-
bility-of-witness remark not prejudicial, since it had not been shown to refer to any particu-
lar male witness).
66. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding state's com-
mon-law rule forbidding women to practice law).
67. 47 N.J. 577, 222 A.2d 73 (1966).
68. Id. at 582-83, 222 A.2d at 76-77.
69. A number of statutes conferring benefits on members of a single sex have passed
constitutional muster. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding statute that
provided property tax exemption for widows but not widowers).
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The argument may also be raised in the non-statutory context.
Ebitz v. Pioneer National Bank70 involved a will calling for the
establishment of a public trust to "aid and assist worthy young
men to acquire a legal education." A potential female legatee ar-
gued that the provision should be read to include her, and the
lower court agreed.71 The state's highest court affirmed, on the
ground that the testator had intended the provision to apply to
members of both sexes. However, it refused to decide what would
have resulted had the provision been intended to favor males. 2
5. Benefit Case No. 2: Classification Should Apply
E has also recently suffered the loss of his wife, a covered em-
ployee under her state's worker's compensation scheme. How-
ever, the applicable statute is more obviously sex-specific in E's
case than it was in D's. E tries to make D's argument, i.e., that
the language should be read to include E's claim. In all likeli-
hood, E will either lose when he makes D's argument, or will
feel it futile to make that argument. Therefore, E instead ar-
gues that the statute denies him equal protection, because it
treats widows of covered male employees better than it treats
widowers of covered female employees.
If the Ebitz court had been unable to decide on the basis of the
testator's intent, it would have been faced with the issue that E
raises here. Courts have considered the equal protection issue in a
number of cases, but they have not produced a clear answer.
A recent state court case roughly follows the facts of E's case.
In Hewitt v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.,73 a mother,
who was covered under Oregon worker's compensation, died, and
the father (not the woman's husband) filed for benefits. The stat-
ute contained a special provision under which an unmarried wo-
man who cohabited with an unmarried man for more than one year
could collect on the death of the covered male cohabitor. Hewitt
70. 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977).
71. Plaintiffs, female law students, sought aid from the trust, but the administering
bank rejected their applications. Probate court held that testator did not intend to exclude
young women from the provisions of the trust. Id. at 211, 361 N.E.2d at 226.
72. The Supreme Judicial Court did not elect to dispose of this case on constitutional
grounds, holding instead that testator's intent to include plaintiffs as potential beneficiaries
could be found from the will as a whole. Id. at 210, 361 N.E.2d at 226.
73. 54 Or. App. 398, 635 P.2d 384 (1981), aff'd, 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970 (1982).
1983]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
argued that the provision should apply as well to unmarried men
under similar circumstances; the court was unwilling to construe
"woman" to include "man," but it agreed with the claimant that
the scheme violated his equal protection rights. 4
On the other hand, at least one federal court has expressed an
unwillingness to find an equal protection violation in a benefit
case. In Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars,75 the female plaintiff
charged that the VFW had violated her constitutional rights by
denying her membership. Initially, the alleged state action was
that Congress had granted the organization a charter that con-
tained male-biased language; the court held that Congress had in-
tended the charter to apply to females as well as males, and that
the use of "he" therein did not violate the fifth amendment.78 The
court of appeals remanded for a consideration of whether any
other state action was involved," and the district court on remand
found none.7 8
C. The Courts' Approaches in the Burden and Benefit Cases
The issues in the five cases discussed above are varied, but the
opinions of the various courts share a common technique and a
common omission. The common technique that all employ is an
individualized approach to the arguments made to them. Gener-
ally, the later cases involving ambiguously sex-biased classifica-
tions do not cite the earlier ones; when an earlier case is cited, it is
most likely to be (1) only from the United States Supreme Court
or from the same jurisdiction and (2) very similar in its facts to the
case before the court.79 For the most part, the principle of stare
decisis does not seem to apply to cases of ambiguously sex-biased
classifications; the interpretations and policy decisions of one judge
do not cross jurisdictional boundaries and influence another
74. 54 Or. App. at 401, 635 P.2d at 388.
75. 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), afl'd, 500 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
76. 353 F. Supp. at 475.
77. 500 F.2d at 788.
78. 394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 822 (1976).
79. E.g., in one of the cases denying a woman the right to practice law, In re Maddox,
93 Md. 727, 50 A. 487 (1901), the court made reference to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). The Iowa court decid-
ing State v. Berch, 222 N.W.2d 741 (1974) similarly relied on an earlier case from the juris-
diction, State v. Clark, 180 Iowa 477, 163 N.W. 250 (1917).
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judge's decisions in this area as such factors so often do. It may go
without saying that the principle of stare decisis is difficult to ap-
ply where, as here, the problem at hand is ill-defined in general
and thus often poorly or inconsistently treated in legal research
sources.
s0
The common omission in these cases is related to the courts'
individualistic approaches to each case. Many of the cases mention
the intent of the legislature, but few of them cite to the actual leg-
islative history. It must be conceded that state legislative histories
are hard or impossible to locate and often insufficient when lo-
cated,"' but the state courts that construe these provisions gener-
ally do not concede this, and seem to instead intuitively find the
intent of the legislatures with limited substantiation. Moreover,
the classifications in federal statutes should not reflect this prob-
lem, since federal legislative history is relatively comprehensive
and well indexed; nevertheless, some federal cases construing these
provisions have failed to refer to legislative history in their individ-
ualistic determinations of the cases before them.
8 2
Consequently, the use by the legislatures of ambiguously-bi-
ased provisions has caused problems, for both litigants who must
attempt these arguments and the courts who must hear them. If
the statutes in the first two cases had been literally gender-neutral
or unambiguously biased, A and B would have been more clearly
right or more clearly wrong, respectively. Similarly, if the legisla-
tures in the last two hypotheticals had clearly said what they had
meant, D and E would have known all along what their rights were
under the statute.
80. It should be recognized that legal research sources have not made the ambiguously-
biased classification a household word; it is difficult to find more than one case construing
such a classification in the same research location. This difficulty may explain why the later
cases do not cite the earlier ones to the extent that one might expect.
81. See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 7, at 432 (historical analysis of state's laws difficult
because of "the complete absence of official legislative history").
82. The case above involving the VFW charter, Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars,
353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), mentions the congressional report issued at the time, but
the opinion does not quote it beyond the bare citation; it cannot be ascertained from the
text of Stearns what the legislative history told the court. The bankruptcy case, Stephens v.




D. The Existing Method of Limiting the Bias - Statutory Rules
of General Construction
Legislatures have given courts some guidance for resolving am-
biguously sex-biased classifications. Congress and most state legis-
latures have included rules of statutory construction in their codi-
fied laws. 3 These statutory provisions instruct courts in such
matters as how to construe plural terms when the singular is speci-
fied,8 4 and how the word "person" is to be applied to corpora-
tions.8 5 For the purposes of this analysis, however, only one such
construction provision is relevant: the type that extends "words
importing the masculine gender" 8 to females.
Almost all of the cases cited in this Comment include at least
some reference to the gender-construction laws of their respective
jurisdictions. In many of the cases, these provisions are dispositive;
that is, the courts rely principally on them to resolve the ambigui-
ties posed by the gender-biased classifications in issue. In many
other cases, however, courts either have refused to be bound by
gender-construction laws or have used them only as supplementary
support in making their decisions. The inconsistencies in the case
law pose problems for litigants such as those in the five earlier hy-
potheticals. Even if a gender-construction law could have applied
to one's case, one could not know beforehand whether the court
would apply it. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the gender-con-
struction law itself contains the same gender bias as the laws to
which it applies.
83. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Similar provisions appear in codified laws of 45 states. See
Official Comment to UNIF. STAT. CONSTR. ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 519 (1980).
84. E.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("words importing the singular include and apply to several
persons, parties, or things; words importing the plurals include the singular .... ."); N.Y.
GN. CONSTR. LAw § 35 (McKinney 1951) ("words in the singular number include the plural,
and in the plural number include the singular").
85. E.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations
."); N.Y. GE. CONST. LAw § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982) ("[w]henever the reference is
to a corporation, board, body, group, organization or other entity comprising more than one
person or to an assemblage of persons or to an inanimate object the reference shall be con-
strued to be neuter in gender.").
86. This exact language appears in the federal gender-construction law (1 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)) and in those of many states. New York's General Construction Law read this way
until 1981; see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
The term "gender-construction law" and abbreviation "GCL" will hereinafter be used to
refer generically to statutory provisions defining the general relationship between grammati-
cal gender and sex classification.
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1. Inconsistent Application. Many of today's gender-con-
struction laws date from late in the nineteenth century,87 or from
early in this century.8 8 Prior to the enactment of these statutes, the
courts recognized, as a rule of statutory construction, that mascu-
line words could extend to females; however, they also recognized
exceptions to that rule. When the Kentucky Court of Appeals de-
cided Atchison v. Lucas,"' it recognized that masculine terminol-
ogy "often is extended to females as well as males. . ." 9 Never-
theless, it concluded that the woman before it, who sought the
office of jailer, was ineligible for that position by virtue of the sex-
specificity of its qualifications. The court refused to extend the
masculine language to her, because she had not shown that the leg-
islature had intended the statute to apply to members of both
sexes.
91
In many other cases, decided after their states' legislatures
had formally enacted gender-construction laws, courts again distin-
guished those provisions in upholding ambiguously sex-biased clas-
sifications. They did so in early "benefit" cases such as In re Mad-
dox.2 The female applicant in Maddox sought to be admitted to
Maryland's bar, aid she argued that the state's classification of
lawyers did not exclude women. Maryland's highest court denied
her application; although a gender-construction law extended mas-
culine words to females, the court held that "the rule whilst gen-
eral is, by its own terms, not without exceptions."9 3 Denying a fe-
male the right to enter the legal profession was, in the court's view,
an exception to the provision intended by the legislature.9
87. E.g., the federal GCL dates from 1871. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
88. E.g., New York's original GCL was passed in 1909. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 22
(Consol. 1909).
89. 83 Ky. 451 (1885).
90. Id. at 464.
91. Id.
92. 93 Md. 727, 50 A. 487 (1901).
93. Id. at 730, 50 A. at 488.
94. Id. at 732, 50 A. at 489. The Maryland Court of Appeals again considered the ques-
tion of ambiguously-biased classification 49 years later in In re Estate of Snyder, 195 Md.
81, 72 A.2d 757 (1950). The case involved a will that referred only to female descendants of
the testator, and one of the litigants argued that the references to females could be con-
strued to apply to males as well. The court said:
It is perhaps an anachronism in this age to hold that the masculine includes all
genders, (Code Article 1, Section 7) but that the feminine does not. That, how-
ever, is clearly true in the construction of statutes.. . . There is great difficulty,
therefore, in finding ... that by "she" the testator meant "he or she."
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Some of the early "burden" cases also show courts distinguish-
ing gender-construction laws to reach their results. The defendant
in McDaniels v. State5 argued that his criminal trial had been un-
fairly prejudiced by the absence of female jurors; he cited an Ari-
zona gender-construction law that extended masculine-gender
terms to females as well as males. The Arizona Supreme Court
heard his case in 1945, and it held that the construction provision
was not enough to extend to women the right to serve on juries:
When the [state] Constitution refers to a jury it refers to a jury as it was
under the common law, and under that law a jury was no jury unless it was
composed of men.. . . The fact that [Arizona's gender-construction law] pro-
vides "words used in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter"
is not sufficient to include women as jurors. 6
The McDaniels case is one of the last to reject the application
of a gender-construction law without a substantial explanation.
The case is especially interesting because seven years earlier the
same Arizona Supreme Court had decided one of the first cases in
which a gender-construction law was dispositive of the issue. The
case, In re Estate of Stark,9 7 involved a dispute between a widower
and a legatee under the decedent's will. The legatee sought probate
of the will; the husband argued that the will should not be recog-
nized, since it predated his marriage to the testator. The widower
relied on an Arizona law which modified the common-law rule that
marriage automatically revoked a will; the statute said that a hus-
band's pre-marriage will was revoked only in the absence of intent
to continue it in effect. The legatee argued that this statute did not
apply to a wife's pre-marriage will, but the court, having found no
evidence of intent to continue the will, applied the gender-con-
struction law and held that testator's will had been revoked.9 5 It
may be merely coincidental that the Arizona court resolved both
cases against the interests of the women involved; in any case, it
should be questioned why the court did not distinguish the holding
of the earlier case when it decided the later one.
In several later cases, courts have continued to rely on gender-
Id. at 91-92, 72 A.2d at 761.
95. 62 Ariz. 339, 158 P.2d 151 (1945).
96. Id. at 343, 158 P.2d at 153.
97. 52 Ariz. 416, 82 P.2d 894 (1938).
98. Id. at 421-25, 82 P.2d at 896-97 (quoting Auz. REv. CODE § 3040(3) (1928) (current
version at Amz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 1-214(c) (1973)).
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construction laws as a device for resolving the ambiguities in sex-
biased classifications. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the
applicability of a vagrancy statute to a female defendant in Adam-
son v. Hoblitzell 9 The statute there defined four different types of
vagrants; three of the definitions used the term "able-bodied male"
and the fourth used the term "able-bodied person." The defendant
argued that the statute did not apply to females. The court dis-
agreed, reasoning that the state legislature's not having used male-
specific language in the fourth definition revealed its intention not
to limit the definition to males. The court also reasoned that the
fact that the subsection preceding the one containing the defini-
tions used the pronoun "he" was inconsequential, since under the
applicable gender-construction law the masculine gender may be
extended to include females.100 A New York court similarly in-
voked a gender-construction law to reject a male defendant's equal
protection argument. The defendant, charged with sodomy, had ar-
gued that the sodomy statute could only be applied to men (and
was therefore unconstitutional), but the court found that females
came within its provisions as well.101
The absence of an applicable gender-construction law has also
proven dispositive. The appellate court in Cincinnati v. Wayne 0 2
refused to apply a male-specific lewdness ordinance to a female de-
fendant, because the city had no gender-construction law with
which to apply the ordinance to her case.
103
If gender-construction provisions like these were always dis-
positive, as they were in these cases, there would be few ambigui-
ties in sex-biased classifications for courts or litigants to resolve on
a case-by-case basis. Other cases make clear, however, that gender-
construction laws are not always dispositive. Most of the statutes
do not purport to apply in all cases, but to apply "unless the sense
of the sentence indicates otherwise." 1' When a qualification of this
99. 279 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1955).
100. Id. at 760 (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. § 446.020 (1942)).
101. People v. Reilly, 85 Misc. 2d 702, 710-12, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732, 740-41 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(quoting N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 22 (McKinney 1951) (amended 1981)). Accord, Common-
wealth v. Baggs, 248 Pa. Super. 133, 392 A.2d 720 (1978) (male defendant, convicted of
failure to support child, unable to make equal protection argument because GCL extended
"he" in statute to mothers as well as fathers).
102. 23 Ohio App. 2d 91, 261 N.E.2d 131 (1970).
103. Id. at 94, 261 N.E.2d at 134.
104. This language is from New York's recently revised gender-construction law. N.Y.
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type is in a jurisdiction's gender-construction law, its courts must
make the determination of when the sense indicates otherwise.
The author of a 1975 Comment l°" has criticized the extent to
which Canadian courts have relied on this type of qualification in
their federal Interpretation Act.10 6 After tracing the history of her
nation's gender-construction law, she concluded, "Wherever any
statute or regulation is drafted in terms of the male, a woman has
no guarantee that it confers any rights on her at all.
'10 7
Gender-construction laws are not always a major aid or a ma-
jor hindrance in solving the problem of ambiguously sex-biased
classifications. In many cases, courts use them only as supplemen-
tary tools to justify their resolutions of the ambiguities on other
grounds.108 Their limited helpfulness, and the extent (however lim-
ited) to which they hinder the eradication of ambiguities, suggest
that they are, at best, only a partial solution to the classification
problem.
2. Reverse Application. When the Commission on Civil
Rights reviewed the U.S. Code, the first recommendation it made
concerned the federal gender-construction law.109 This statute, like
many of its state counterparts, 1 0 is itself ambiguously biased; it
clearly states that "words importing the masculine gender include
the feminine," ' but it does not make clear what can be included
in words importing the feminine gender.
The ambiguous sex bias present in the gender-construction
laws themselves raises two issues: one of judicial practice, and one
of legislative motive. As to practice, it may be observed that while
courts have readily used gender-construction laws to extend mas-
culine terms to women, they have been less willing to sanction the
GN. CONSTR. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
105. Comment, Alice through the Statutes, 21 McGmL L.J. 685, 702 (1975).
106. Can. Stat. 1970, c. 1-23, s. 3(1).
107. See Comment, supra note 105, at 702.
108. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 465 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Va. 1979) (GCL in old
Bankruptcy Act aided court in finding that wife's debts were no more dischargeable in
bankruptcy than were husband's); People v. Gilliam, 108 Mich. App. 695, 310 N.W.2d 843
(1981) (Penal Code's GCL helped convict defendant of felony non-support, defeating his
argument that the statute had been improperly applied to men only).
109. SEX BIAS IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 51-53.
110. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("words importing the masculine gender include the feminine
as well"); similar state provisions abound.
111. Id.
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opposite extension of feminine terms to men. Hewitt v. State Acci-
dent Insurance Fund Corp.,112 a recent Oregon case, illustrates
this judicial reluctance. The substantive statute provided worker's
compensation benefits to an unmarried woman who cohabited with
a covered male for a specified period. Hewitt, an unmarried man,
sought benefits under the statute after cohabiting for the specified
time with a covered female. The state's gender-construction law
was held not to extend to female-specific terms, and the court
therefore rejected the plaintiff's claim that the statute literally ap-
plied to him.11 3
One may also raise a question of legislative motive in connec-
tion with the male-specific language in gender-construction provi-
sions. It might be argued that legislatures drafted these statutes in
sex-specific terms because they were faced only with a need to in-
clude women under male-specific legislation, there being no corre-
sponding need to include men under female-specific laws. While
this explanation no doubt covers many instances of general-con-
struction enactment, there have been other situations in which leg-
islatures have used gender-construction laws to create new ambigu-
ities. At the federal level, for instance, Congress has amended the
U.S. Code in several places to replace unbiased references (such as
"he or she") with biased ones, on the ground that the deleted
nouns and pronouns are made unnecessary by gender-construction
laws. 1 4 Similarly, for many years, New York legislators have been
formally advised to write their bills in ambiguously sex-biased
form.
115
The federal and state drafters in these relatively recent in-
stances have justified their changes on aesthetic grounds; the offi-
cial reason in New York has been that the gender-construction law
"generally makes unnecessary the use of 'he or she', 'his or her',
etc." 1 ' It has been argued in this Comment, however, that legisla-
112. 54 Or. App. 398, 635 P.2d 384 (1981), afl'd, 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 790.
113. Id. at 401, 635 P.2d at 386.
114. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3742 (1982). The section authorizes the award of a distin-
guished-service cross to any person who "distinguishes himself" in some noble way. The
enacting Congress expressly omitted reference to one's distinguishing "herself," on the
ground that the GCL, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) made reference to females unnecessary.
115. LEGISLATIVE BiLL DRAFTING COUM'N, STATE OF NEW YORK, BIL DRAFTING MNANUAL
23 (undated, circa. 1982).
116. Id. The Drafting Commission will be revising its manual because the 1981 amend-
ment to New York's GCL makes the "he or she" illustration "no longer a good example" of
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tors of earlier years used similar-sounding justifications to conceal
more politically-motivated actions.117 Therefore, toda y's courts
should carefully determine the true intent of their jurisdictions'
legislature when construing ambiguously-biased provisions. When
a facially ambiguous passage turns out to be an intentionally bi-
ased one, a court should apply to it the same level of scrutiny as
the court would to a literally biased law. Courts should be particu-
larly careful in interpreting formerly gender-neutral statutes that
have been amended, ostensibly on aesthetic grounds, to conform
them to the gender-construction principle.
Legislators, for their part, should be wary of giving rules of
construction priority over substantive provisions of law. Gender-
constructions should guide the courts in their interpretation of am-
biguities, and should not encourage legislators to create additional
ambiguities.
II. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: REMOVING AMBIGUOUSLY SEx-BIASED
PROVISIONS FROM STATUTES AND OTHER LEGAL WRITING
A. Reforming the Statutes - Generalized and Particularized
Approaches to Removing Ambiguously-Biased Classifications
The Commission on Civil Rights approached the problem of
sex-biased classifications in the U.S. Code in two steps. First, it
identified the potentially problematical sections of the Code
through its large-scale computer study; then, it became more selec-
tive in its scope when it evaluated and made its recommendations
as to specific provisions that the computer retrieved. 118 If a legisla-
ture is to attempt to eradicate the unnecessarily ambiguous classi-
fications in its codified laws, it should consider both large-scale and
selective approaches, as did the Commission. Neither approach is
without problems; a coordinated application of both approaches,
therefore, could produce the most significant improvement.
The most selective approach available to a legislature would
be to reform specific ambiguously sex-biased provisions as specific
complaints of improper bias come from constituents or courts.
Many specific provisions have already been modified or repealed
conciseness in drafting. Telephone interview with George Schindler, bill drafter for the
Drafting Comm'n (Nov. 1, 1982).
117. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
118. SEx BAs IN THE CODE, supra note 14, at 9-13.
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by legislatures using this approach. For example, Massachusetts
has eliminated a particular, objectionable classification of victims
from its sex offense statutes.11 As a result, the commonwealth's
courts can now extend the protection of its penal law to both male
and female victims of sex crimes. 2 0 The main advantage of this
approach is that the resulting classifications become acceptably
unambiguous. The courts, which otherwise might have no way to
ascertain the intent of the legislature, obtain a clear indication of
what the statute writers intended. On the other hand, the limita-
tion on this approach is a potentially serious one: persons affected
by the classification prior to the legislative change may have a lim-
ited remedy, if any remedy at all. Since legislators may have to
wait for harm to result before taking this type of action, the effec-
tiveness of so selective an approach must be questioned.
At the other extreme, a legislature could eradicate all ambigu-
ously sex-biased classifications by employing a substantially modi-
fied version of today's gender-construction laws. If a state wished
to go this far, it would amend its gender-construction law to pro-
vide (1) that all words importing one gender apply to members of
both sexes, and (2) that this rule not be limited by the context of
any particular substantive statute. The reform would eliminate all
ambiguity from written law, but it could also produce unwanted, or
even impossible, results.
1 21
A more sensible approach to the problem of ambiguous bias in
statutory law would combine the better aspects of selective and
large-scale solutions. A large-scale study of ambiguously sex-biased
classifications in a jurisdiction's codified laws would be appropri-
ate, because it would bring most of them to the attention of the
legislature for evaluation and possible change.1 22 Courts would
119. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West 1970) (amended 1974).
120. Commonwealth v. Gallant, 373 Mass. 577, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977).
121. Such a law could eliminate valid sex-based classifications (i.e., those that serve
important or compelling governmental objectives) and extend pregnancy-hospitalization
benefits to men. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has hinted that there is precedent
for a powerful GCL. In Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the
Court quoted the sponsor of the "Dictionary Act," 16 Stat. 431 (1871), as saying, "when the
word 'he' is used it shall include females as well as males." 436 U.S. at 689 n.53 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 775 (1871)). The Court itself underscored the word
"shall," and acceded to this directive throughout its opinion; it is possible, then, that a
large-scale solution using a powerful GCL could be accepted by the Supreme Court.
122. Biased provisions can be found by other means than computer printouts. The con-
gressional committee system provides a means by which statutes under the purview of each
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have records of these large-scale studies; they could rely on them
for guidance where the legislature made no clear choice, and they
would know of the legislature's selective decisions to change or re-
tain other provisions. Ambiguity would be removed; the remaining
biased classifications would be unambiguous; and, if they met the
applicable constitutional standard,123 they would be valid.
Legislatures could also formulate comprehensive, but selective,
solutions to the ambiguous bias existing in many of their gender-
construction laws. They could choose to end litigants' problems of
inconsistency in application,124 by deleting the provisions that pre-
vent extension of sex-specific terms where "the sense of the sen-
tence indicates otherwise."1 5 Each could also make a separate de-
cision to end judges' problems with reverse application,2 8 by
removing the sex-specific terms from the gender-construction laws
themselves. New York chose the latter option in 1981, and today,
"words of the masculine or feminine gender... shall be deemed
to refer to both male or female persons.
'1 27
Since gender-construction laws can apply generally to all stat-
utes or only to certain ones, a legislature could limit the extent of
its reform as it wished. It could accomplish large-scale reform by
applying its amended gender-construction law to all laws;1 28 it
could exempt certain substantive laws by attaching separate gen-
committee could be evaluated for unacceptable bias. A 1973 House resolution suggested that
its committees use their expertise to study biases in their respective areas of legislation.
H.R. Res. 108, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
123. I.e, that the classification served "important governmental objectives," as articu-
lated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
124. See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
125. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
126. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
127. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
128. E.g., the modified GCL could replace not only the state's most general rule of
construction, but also those attached to particular sections of law. In New York, for in-
stance, in addition to the N.Y. GEN. CONsTR. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982), "mini-GCL"
provisions may be found at:
N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 1-104(14) (McKinney 1978);
N.Y. EsT. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-1.3(b) (McKinney 1981);
N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-102(5)(b) (McKinney 1964); and
N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW § 359(a) (McKinney 1970).
These gender-construction laws differ in content from the general one in N.Y. GEN. CON-
STR. LAW § 22 (McKinney Supp. 1982), and each only applies to the chapter of the consoli-
dated laws in which it appears. The largest-scale use of the modified GCL, then, would have
to replace all of these limited provisions.
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der-construction provisions to them; 29 or, most selectively, it could
apply the revised gender-construction principles only to those laws
from which the legislature wanted ambiguity removed.18 0 The prin-
ciple of gender construction can also extend to legal documents
such as wills and contracts, to resolve in advance the problems that
courts have had to resolve under existing law.
B. Reforming All Legal Writing - A General Solution to a
General Problem
Some legislators believe that they may not solve the problems
of ambiguously sex-biased classifications by any other means than
the ones suggested in the previous section. According to one recent
Comment, "The only other solution is to invent a new series of
pronouns, but that is not something that draftsmen may do; they
must take our languages as they are."131 A later Comment severely
criticized this view, 3 2 but despite the criticism, it should be recog-
nized that even linguists have found the general problem of gender
bias in English a difficult one to solve.133
It does not follow from this recognition, however, that legal
writers should resign themselves both to using male-specific words
and pronouns, and to relying on gender-construction principles to
convey their meaning.'" Lawyers and judges can eradicate ambigu-
129. A somewhat more selective approach would be to retain or amend separately all of
the mini-GCL provisions in state laws. This would eradicate bias in all areas except those in
which the special gender-construction laws already applied.
130. If the state were to alter only one or more of its limited GCL provisions (i.e., those
affecting only certain sections of the state's laws), the approach would be the most selective,
because its general-purpose GCL would not change.
131. Comment, Are Statutes Written For Men Only?, 22 McGn, L L.J. 666, 672 (1976).
132. Comment, The Language of Oppression - Alice Talks Back, 23 McGML L.J. 535
(1977).
133. See supra note 11 and works collected there for insight into linguistic approaches
to removing gender bias from English.
134. The McGill Law Journal published a Comment, a reply Comment, and a counter-
reply Comment on this legal writing problem. The opening Comment criticized the Cana-
dian government's reliance on gender-construction laws and called for improved use of other
solutions to the problem of ambiguous classifications. See Comment, supra note 105. The
reply Comment argued that legislatures had to take languages "as is," and asserted that
GCL's made male-biased pronouns legally acceptable. See Comment, supra note 131. The
original commentator pointed out the ease with which government officials can coin techni-
cal words, thus opening the possibility that legal writers could effect a fundamental change
in the language. Until this change comes about, the commentator advocated the use of ex-
isting gender-neutral words with greater flexibility. See Comment, supra note 132, at 542-
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ous bias from their legal writing without waiting for gender-neutral
terms to evolve. Such writers should expect that their efforts to
write gender-free English may be resisted, but they should also ex-
pect similar resistance to alternatives. Professor Wydick has de-
scribed the dilemma as follows:
[W]riting genderless English is not easy. If you write "each judge has his own
ideals," you will be faulted for ignoring the women on the bench. If you write
"each judge has his or her own ideals," you will be faulted for clumsy con-
struction. If you write "all judges have their own ideals," you will be faulted
for not stating clearly what you mean. 135
Wydick makes several suggestions about how to escape this di-
lemma. "Phrases like he or she," he writes, "can be used in moder-
ation, but it is usually less clumsy to recast the sentence ... "136
To recast sentences, he advises (1) omitting sex-specific pronouns
when no pronoun is required, (2) using second-person pronouns
("you," "your") when one is required, and (3) changing singular
nouns and pronouns to the plural when possible.137 The gist of
Wydick's advice is to deal with each ambiguous classification on a
case-by-case basis; for him, however, a "case" is a substantial unit
of legal writing such as a sentence or paragraph. Legislators essen-
tially are following this advice when they evaluate ambiguous clas-
sifications in their statutory contexts. It is just as important, how-
ever, that all legal writers can conduct the same type of evaluation
in their own legal writing. By using what English already provides
for avoiding bias, and by using redundant terms like "he or she"
only sparingly, "he" and "man" could become terms of dead-letter
law, just like "thee" and "thou." They would still exist as words,
but they would not cause any further problems for lawyers or
courts.
CONCLUSION
Ambiguously-biased classifications based on sex form a signifi-
cant part of existing law, as the cases collected here illustrate.
These cases also illustrate the ineffectiveness of the built-in "solu-
tion" of gender-construction laws. While a few of the cases in this
44.
135. Wydick, supra note 12, at 752.
136. Id. at 753.
137. Id. at 753-54. Wydick also sanctions use of the passive voice "if you are desper-
ate." Id. at 754.
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analysis are from the nineteenth century, many more have been
resolved in the past five years. Their recent appearance suggests
that lawyers and litigants will not ignore these classifications until
legislatures clarify them or remove them from the law.
Readers of this Comment may observe that Part I was rela-
tively lengthy in discussing the problem's severity, Part II rela-
tively brief in discussing its solution. In a sense, however, as ex-
tended a discussion of the solution is not necessary. One might
observe that the text and notes of this Comment contain no gen-
der-biased language, other than that used in the cases and statutes
under analysis. The work is offered as an illustration that gender-
neutrality is possible in even complex forms of legal writing.138 It
can be done; what remains is for all legal writers to attempt to do
it.
RAY STILWELL
138. Drafters have begun writing even complex legal provisions in completely gender-
neutral terms. For two good examples, see the text of New York's Equitable Distribution
Law, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1982), and the MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SiONAL CoNDucT (Proposed Final Draft 1982).
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